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Kaminski: The Market Defense Debate

COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE MARKET
DEFENSE: A NATIONAL DEBATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of comparable worth is rooted in a simple premise: salaries should be based on the intrinsic value of the employee's work to the employer. l Yet attempts to enact comparable worth measures have caused controversy in state legislatures,
city boardrooms, and courts.2 Increasingly, the debate has centered on the market's role in setting wages. Comparable worth
advocates argue that employers pay women a sex-slanted wage
which is illegal under Title VII. Employers, in turn, urge that far
from being discriminatory, such wages reflect the market's workings, and are necessary to their survival. s The defense has hitherto proven remarkably successful before the courts. Two recent
decisions illustrate the ground gained by its advocates.
On December 14, 1983, in American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees v. Washington (AFSCME
1), 4 a United States District Court ruled that Washington had
discriminated against approximately 15,500 state employees, at
least seventy percent of whom were women, by paying them
twenty percent less than men doing jobs of comparable worth.
I)

1. Comparable worth "call[s] . . . for equal pay for male and female .•. [employees] doing work requiring comparable skill, effort and responsibility under similar working conditions." Bellack, Comparable Worth: A Practitioner's View, in 1 COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 75, 75 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984).
2. For a good overview of the debate, see 1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's
(U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984); COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (E. Livernash ed. 1980). See also Williams, Comparable Worth: Legal Perspectives anaPrecedents, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 148 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984).
"[T]he essence of the doctrine is that compensation should be proportional to the intrinsic 'worth' or 'value' of jobs, as measured on some common scale." Id. at 149.
3. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
4. 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for rehearing filed (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (Nos. 84-3569, 84-3590) [hereinafter
cited as AFSCME 1].
5. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 863. The plaintiffs brought suit as a class of approximately 15,500 employees. All worked either for the Higher Education Personnel Board
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The court ordered immediate implementation of a salary schedule based on a 1974 comparable worth study the State had conducted. The court also ordered four years of back pay for each of
the 15,500 employees affected. 6
On September 4, 1985, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed (AFSCME II).' The court held that under Title VII,s
the plaintiffs had not shown that Washington's salary structure
had either a discriminatory impact or resulted from intentional
discrimination.9 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit went further than
any previous court in accepting the validity of market-based
wages and characterizing individual employers as passive registers of market forces. 1o
This Comment is an analysis of the two decisions. It focuses
on the "market defense" itself11 by examining its validity in the
context of current trends in wage policy. Also included is a discussion of its strategic uses by an actual employer and a look at
the "politics" of comparable worth in Washington and the city
of San Francisco.
(HEPB), the State Personnel Board (SPB), or the Department of Personnel (DOP). The
HEPB has jurisdiction over all those employed in the state's institutions of higher learning; the SPB and DOP hire and supervise all state agency employees. Id. at 860.
6. Id. at 871. The order responded to a wage gap of approximately 20% found in 62
job classifications employing 70% or more women when compared to 59 classifications in
which 70% or more men worked. Id. at 861. Updates to the study conducted in 1976,
1979 and 1980 broadening the class showed similar disparities. Id. at 865 n.9. See also
infra notes 12-14, 20 and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
7. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Washington,
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for rehearing filed (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (Nos.
84-3569, 84-3590) (specially remanded to the district court for settlement discussions on
January 22, 1986; the Ninth Circuit retained jurisdiction for possible rehearing) [hereinafter cited as AFSCME II].
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),(2) (1982).
9. AFSCME I, 770 F.2d at 1405, 1408. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),(2)(1982). Title
VII prohibits employment discrimination using two theories: disparate impact and disparate treatment. The latter has been read as requiring a showing of intentional discrimination on the part of the employer. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). Under the former, all that is required is a showing by the plaintiff(s)
that a facially neutral policy not justified by business necessity of the employer's had a
discriminatory impact on them. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See infra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion.
10. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1406.
11. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text for an extended discussion on the
market defense.
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II. AFSCME I AND II
A.

BACKGROUND

The American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees union sued the State of Washington after the latter's
own study showed serious sex-based pay inequity existing in its
workforce. l2 In 1974, the State of Washington hired Norman
Willis, a professional management consultant, to evaluate the
problem. I3 His independent study confirmed a twenty percent
wage gap between sixty-two female-dominated and fifty-nine
male-dominated job classes. I4 In two updates, adding eighty-five
new classifications to the study, the State and Willis both projected the costs of equalizing state salaries.III In 1977, the State
amended its compensation statutes,t6 earmarking the necessary
funds. I7 Each state agency then created a supplemental pay
schedule using comparable worth principles. Then, in a surplus
year, Governor Dixie Lee Ray cut the appropriations from the
budget. IS The State has since been adamant in refusing to implement the new schedules. I9
12. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 851. The study was conducted by the HEPB and
the DOP jointly. On January 8, 1974, the two Boards issued findings which included
"clear indications of pay differences between [job] classes predominantly held by men
and those predominantly held by women within the State systems and concluded such
differences were not due to job worth alone." Id. at 860-61. Both Boards recommended
further study to measure the pay gap and suggest a remedy. Id.
13. Id. at 861. Representatives of DOP and HEPB chose the job classifications to be
studied, and evaluations of each were "arrived at by [the] consensus ... of [members]
consisting primarily of representatives of State agencies and institutions." Id.
14. Id. Willis also found that the greater the job worth, the greater was the discrimination factor. "For jobs evaluated at 100 points, men's pay was 125% of women's pay."
Id. "For jobs evaluated at 450 points, however, men's pay was 135% that of women's
. . . ." Id.
15. Id. at 861-62.
16. ld. at 862.
17.ld.
18. Id. Although the AFSCME I court did not elaborate on the costs of discrimination when balanced against those of implementing the comparable worth study, Washington's governor Dixie Lee Ray did in 1980: "The dollar cost of solution will be high; it
probably cannot be achieved in one action. But the cost of perpetuating the unfairness
within State government itself, is too great to put off any longer . . . ." Id. Despite Ray's
insight, the State did nothing to remedy the problem until 1983 after the AFSCME I
class action suit had already been filed. That year the state legislature passed two bills
calling for full implementation of comparable worth for some of the classes affected by
June 30, 1993. Id. at 862-63. See also infra note 67 and accompanying text for a fuller
discussion of the costs of discrimination.
19. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 862-64.
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PERSPECTIVES ON PAY EQUITY

The two decisions differ most in perspective. The AFSCME
I court was the nation's first to accept "comparable worth" as
viable under Title VIpo That court also rejected the "market
defense" urged by the State.21 The AFSCME II court followed
earlier rulings rejecting "comparable worth" principles;22 the
court favored wages set in response to a variety of market
forces. 23
1.

AFSCME I: The Nation's Interest m Ending Gender
Discrimination

In reaching their distinct holdings, both courts focused on
the State's refusal to implement comparable worth studies it
had itself commissioned. 24 Yet only the AFSCME I court found
the State's refusal was a violation of Title VII.25 The court's approach was novel. It linked the existing twenty percent wage gap
20. Id. at 865-67. Using the 1974 Willis study as its base, the AFSCME I court
became the first in the country to find that Title VII has been violated when jobs comparable in knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountability and working conditions to
those predominantly held by men earn less because they are held predominantly by
women. Id. at 866. Until this decision, it was not clear that Title VII could entertain a
"comparable worth theory" although the statute could be applied to a wide range of
discriminatory job practices, including wage discrimination. See generally County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d
686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 511 (1984); Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa,
563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Although Spaulding, Lemons, and Christensen all reject
comparable worth as a viable theory under Title VII, all three agree that Title VII has
broad remedial powers whose exact scope is still unclear. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 699-701;
Lemons, 620 F.2d at 229; Christensen, 563 F.2d at 355-56.
21. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 867. In rejecting Washington'S defense, the
AFSCME I court chided it for being a government that "in the eighth decade of the
Twentieth Century [is] attempting to use the American legal system to maintain attitudes and concepts that are no longer acceptable under the provisions of Title VI!." 578
F. Supp. at 868 n.17.
22. See Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 706-07 (9th Cir. 1984), cert
den., 105 U.S. 511 (1984); Lemons V. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen V. 'Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 35657 (8th Cir. 1977).
23. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407.
24. Compare AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 860-63 with AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at
1404,1408.
25. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 867.
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to the State's past acts of discrimination. 26 The court thus put
the findings of the Willis study into a broader context-one of
longstanding discriminatory practices toward women.2'1. The
court reasoned that existing, intentional patterns of wage discrimination were outgrowths of these former policies28 and the
product of current wage policy, including the S:tate's seminal decision in 1978 to conduct a comparable worth study.29 In short,
the AFSCME I court viewed the employer as an actor, playing a
pivotal role in setting wages. 30
The court also broke ground in rejecting the State's claims
that implementing the Willis studies would be too costly. The
court disagreed, finding the nation's interest in ending sex discrimination greater. 31 The court held that the latter overrode the
State's claims of legitimate business necessity in maintaining a
sex-based wage gap.32 The district court then ordered Washington to remedy the pay disparity without further delay.33
26. The court reached into the State's history and the nation's past for examples of
blatant discriminatory attitudes toward women by government officials. In Washington,
this included a definition of state citizenship which excluded women and was upheld by
its highest court in 1888. Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 59, 19 P. 135 (1888). The
Declaration of Independence went even further by failing to mention women at all.
AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 866 n.ll (citing The Declaration of Independence (U.S.
1776».
27.. The court noted contemporary discriminatory practices by the State which included the running of segregated help wanted ads from the 1950's to 1973, setting salaries based on discriminatory criteria, and failing to implement its own findings and recommendations to correct continuing pay inequity. Id. at 860.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 865-67.
30. Id. at 865-70.
31. One of the most interesting things about the AFSCME I decision was its ~mpha
sis on balancing the defendants' business justifications against the nation's interest in
ending employment discrimination to see which were overriding. AFSCME I, 578 F.
Supp. at 856-57 (citing Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir.
1982); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1977». The court 'concluded that ending
such discrimination has more urgency than any business rationale the state had offered.
AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 863.
32. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 863. The court found the state had "failed to produce credible, admissible evidence demonstrating a legitimate and overriding business
justification . . . ." Id.
33. Id. at 868, 871. In ordering immediate implementation of the study and back
pay to 1979 for all 15,500 members of the class, the court pointed to the lessons of Brown
v. Board of Education, 394 U.S. 294 (1955), and its progeny, namely that to delay a
remedy was often fatal to its effectiveness. "It is time, right now for a remedy," the court
concluded. Id. at 868 (emphasis in the original).
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The AFSCME II Decision: The Costs of Pay Equity

The Ninth Circuit also focused on the Willis studies. 34 That
court, however, saw the studies as merely a part of a complex
compensation system. The court cited the large number of government hearings, proposals, and recommendations involved in
formulating state salaries as proof. 35 The court, moreover, found
a variety of equally complex "market forces" shaping the State's
deliberations. 36 In the court's view, the State had done nothing
more than carry out wage measures dictated by such forces. 37
The State's refusal to implement the Willis studies was thus too
intricate to label either intentionally discriminatory, or as having a disparate impact on women. 38
34. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1403-04, 1406-08.
35. Id. at 1406.
36.Id.
37. Id. Although earlier courts had echoed AFSCME Irs position, none had gone as
far in focusing its entire decision on the market as an external regulator, largely responsible for wage disparity, rather than on the employer as a wage setter. See generally
supra note 22. But see California State Employee's Association v. California, No. C-847275 MHP (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 1985) (Memorandum and Order granting conditional
class certification) (a recent district court decision setting some limits on the market
defense).
38. AFSCME I, 770 F.2d at 1405-06, 1408. The court contrasted the state's wage
system with specific employment practices such as height and weight requirements, the
requirement of a high school diploma where one is not needed to adequately perform a
job, and mandatory maternity leave, and characterized au as facially neutral policies
having a discriminatory impact under Title VII. The court also found the state's failure
to implement its studies lacked the requisite animus to support a finding of intentional
discrimination.Id. at 1406-07; see also supra text accompanying note 36.
In Gunther, however, a study very similar to that conducted in Washington was
done by the County of Washington. The study revealed that although female matrons
working in its jails should have been earning 95% of what male guards were, based on
the duties of each, the county was paying the matrons only 70% of the wages earned by
male guards. There, too, the county refused to remedy the wage gap based on its own
findings. The court accepted the county's failure as evidence of an intent to discriminate
against its female employees under Title VII. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161 (1981).
Interestingly, a recent Minnesota appellate court decision distinguished Gunther on
the facts above, from a situation in which an employer did implement the findings of job
evaluation market survey resulting in allegations of sex discrimination under Title VII.
Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 415 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985). While rejecting comparable worth as a viable theory under Title VII, the
Bohm court obviously agreed that, among other things, Gunther stands for the proposition that a failure to implement the findings of an employer's own studies is evidence of
an intent to discriminate. Id. at 500. AFSCME II, however, clearly rejected that proposition, despite Gunther. "Assuming, however, that like other job evaluation studies, ... [a
comparable worth study] ... may be useful as a diagnostic tool, we reject a rule that
would penalize rather than commend employers for their effort and innovation in under-
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The court also found the state-approved wage gap between
predominately male and female job classes a necessary part of
legitimate budgetary restraints without, however, citing supporting data. 39 The court thus implied that closing such a gap was
cost-prohibitive.40 Finally, the court's silence on the desirability
of achieving pay equity was striking!l
In short, the AFSCME II court depicted the marketplace as
an actor too elusive and complex for Title VII analysis42 and
characterized the employer as a register too passive to hold liable!3 AFSCME I differed in its historical perspective, its passion, and its focus on the employer!4 Taken together, the two
decisions encompass the flavor and scope of a national debate,
offering radically differing visions of the economy, the effect of
the economy on employers and wage-earners, and the issue of
pay equity.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET DEFENSE
The "market defense" was not prominent in early Title VII
wage discrimination cases.45 The landmark County of Washington v. Gunther46 decision had established that Title VII actions
can encompass a variety of discriminatory employment practices
and that such actions were not limited to those alleging unequal
pay for the same or substantially similar work as that done by
men. The decision, however, said nothing about the elements of
a Title VII wage discrimination claim!? Thus, initially, the
taking ... [it]." AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408.
39. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407.
40. See AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408. See also infra notes 60-62 and accompanying
text for a fuller discussion of this important issue.
41. The court's only reference to the subject was its observation that Washington
was not responsible in creating it. AFSCME 11,770 F.2d at 1407.
42. Id. at 1406 (citing Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d at 708 (1984»;
see also AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at1407-08.
43. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408.
44. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text for relevant discussion.
45. See generally AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. 840, 856-59; Dean, Comparable Worth,
in WOMEN AND THE LAW 2-7 to 2-7 to -15 (C. Lefcourt ed. 1984). The latter provides both
an excellent summary and analysis of the elements of a wage discrimination claim
brought under Title VII; see also Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120,
1125 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing appellate standards of review).
46. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178-81 (1981).
47. In affirming for the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court specifically declined to rule on
the merits of the plaintiff's sex discrimination under Title VII, or set "standards for the
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ruling produced an evidentiary battle. The debate centered on
(1) the evidence necessary to show either disparate impact or
disparate treatment under Title VII, and (2) which party carried
the burden of proof in either case.48 While this was a highly
technical phase of Title VII litigation, plaintiffs did gain significant ground. They won the right to bring suit under a variety of
theories. 49 They then tested Title VII's scope-for the first time
raising comparable worth under the statute. 50 In doing so, the
plaintiffs contrasted pay based on the intrinsic value of their
work with wages determined by a sex-slanted market. 51 Defendants responded with claims that they set wages according to legitimate market forces-hence the "market defense."52 In numerous rulings holding for the defendant, the courts agreed,
depicting market-based salary systems as given. All refused,
therefore, to hold employers liable for any resulting pay gaps. 53
further conduct of ... [similar] litigation." Id. at 166. Instead, the Court held only that
"claims of discriminatory undercompensation are not barred by Section 703(h) of Title
VII merely because ... [female guards] do not perform work equal to that of male ...
guards . . . ." Id. at 181. The Supreme Court in Gunther, "stressing the broad remedial
purposes of Title VII .•. [also] construed the Bennett Amendment to incorporate into
Title VII the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act, but not to limit discrimination suits involving pay to the cause of action provided in the Equal Pay Act." AFSCME
II, 770 F.2d at 1404 (citing Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168-71).
48. See AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 857-59, showing how the shifting burdens of
proof/production are allocated between plaintiff and defendant; see also Dean, supra
note 45, at 2-8 nn.21, 22-26, 2-9, 2-10 n.40, 2-11, showing ongoing developments in this
area, including varying judicial interpretations by the courts of the type of evidence necessary to meet such burdens.
49. AFSCME I, 578 F. Supp. at 856. Both "the availability of disparate impact analysis" in such cases, and the possibility of "the same set of facts giv[ing] rise to a claim
under the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories" were originally unclear,
but subsequently won acceptance by the courts. Id. at 856.
50. But see Dean, supra note 45, at 2-17 to -18, showing various judicial attempts to
limit the impact of Gunther, 452 U.S. at 161, particularly in the context of "comparable
worth" claims.
51. See generally Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 706 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 511 (1984); Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d
228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d
353, 355 (8th Cir. 1977).
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. This cluster of cases is presently the
main theoretical base of the "market defense." In each, the defendants reiterated the
claim of paying wages based on legitimate market forces, an argument the courts readily
approved, in holding that any wage gaps (between male and female workers) resulting
are outside the scope of Title VII's remedial powers.
53. See Spaulding, 740 2d at 686; Lemons, 620 F.2d at 228; Christensen, 563 F.2d at
353.
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In Spaulding v. University of Washington/,4 the court, nevertheless, empl;1asized the poor quality of statistical evidence
plaintiffs had offered to support their comparable worth arguments. This implied that if more reliable data were presented,
the court might find the underlying comparable worth argument
more acceptable. ISIS
The AFSCME II ruling made it clear that this was not the
case. Unable to discredit the data gathered in the Willis study,
that court shifted direction. It found that using any statistical
data to prove intentional discrimination was suspect without
further supporting evidence.1SS The shift clarified that the court's
dislike of comparable worth was a philosophical one.1S7
Also evident was the shift of the comparable worth debate
to a scrutiny of the market. Thus far, however, employers have
provided courts with little more than generalities about the market's role in wage setting.lSs Plaintiffs armed with specific findings on the market's actual workings might effectively offset
54. E.g., Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 703·04. The Spaulding court found the plaintiff's
wage statistics defective because they were gathered solely within the University of
Washington (rather than being compared with wages paid by other universities or the
outside labor market). Id. at 704. The court also emphasized that wages for females
working in the nursing faculty had not been compared to those of female faculty in other
departments.ld. Moreover, it complained of research done by paralegals who did not use
a multiple regression model, an accepted and more sophisticated approach to gathering
statistical proof of discriminatory treatment and impact. Id. (citing D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (Supp. 1983); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 705 (1980». Because the Spaulding COurt decided the statistics were too flawed to be reliable, it "refuse[d] to specify exactly the role
such comparative statistics play" in wage discrimination cases under Title VII. Id. (emphasis added). Note, however, how this finding also reflects the limited financial resources of plaintiffs undertaking such suits, since the more sophisticated the data gathered, the more costly.
55. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 704.
56. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407 (citing Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 703 (1984». "[J]ob
evaluation studies and comparable worth statistics alone are insufficient to establish the
requisite inference of discriminatory motive critical to the disparate treatment theory."
Id. As already noted, however, the Spaulding court refused "to specify exactly what role
... comparative statistics play ... [because of the unreliability of the plaintiffs' data]."
AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407. Thus AFSCME II appears to overstate Spaulding. See
also Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686, 704.
57. The AFSCME II court found the comparable worth concept itself had not
proven to be "a feasible approach to employee compensation [but rather] a matter of
debate." AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1408.
58. See infra note 70 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of this complex issue.
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such generalities in court. The result could be a change in judicial perception of the issues involved. 59
IV. THE MARKET DEFENSE AS STRATEGY
Employers owe their current success before the courts to an
insistence that they are economic competitors whose bottom line
is survival.60 They repeatedly use several techniques to reinforce
this image. Uniformly in articles and amicus briefs, employers
emphasize the astronomical costs of comparable worth to the
59.Id.
60. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Assoc. of Washington Business at 28, AFSCME II.
Although the fairness of the free market may be debated, the
market itself is an economic reality that a comparable worth
study cannot alter. An employer, even if armed with such a
study, must compete . . . . [He] must set wages high enough
to attract and retain qualified workers, but low enough to keep
production at a competitive level. Thus . . . his decision to
abide by the market's valuation of a job, rather than that of a
comparable worth committee, simply reflects an awareness
that the market is the milieu in which •.. [he] must operate.
Id.
"In structuring wage systems . . . employers . • . regularly take into account the
need for external competitiveness. For a wage system to be effective, ... it must compensate the jobs within the employer's organization at rates that are competitive with
... [those] existing in the outside labor market for those jobs." Amicus Curiae Brief of
the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 16, AFSCME II (emphasis in original). See
1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2; see, e.g., R WILLIAMS &
L. KESSLER, A CLOSER LOOK AT COMPARABLE WORTH at 39-48 (1984); 0 Neill, An Argument Against Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH; ISSUE FOR THE 80's 177, 184
(1984) (speaking of the private sector).
In a letter to Christine Curtis, the chairperson of the Comparable Worth Task
Force, the President of Federated Employers of the Bay Area, representing 1000 Bay
Area companies and 25 affiliated associations, also emphasized that "the 'average' employer in ... [California] has 20 employees ... [while] ..• 94 percent have less than 50
... and approximately 50 percent employ three or less . . . ." Letter from J. Arthur
Lindsay to Christine Curtis at 1. (December 28, 1984) (discussing effect of comparable
worth on larger employers). He then explained that since his organization represents
employers only 25% of whom employ less than 50 workers, he is attaching a position
paper written by a member association representing 50,000 California small businesses.
Id. at 1-2. The attached paper concluded that implementation of comparable worth
would place small employers at a competitive disadvantage. Any personnel strategy
could expose him to the risk of litigation and liability, particularly given the subjective
nature of job evaluation. J. Sloan Jr., The Practical Consequences of Comparable Worth
for Small Business 47-49 (December 19, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
The aforementioned represents a much more subtle attempt to persuade policy
makers that comparable worth threatens the survival of both large and small businesses,
since the arguments Sloan makes for smaller companies somehow reverberate when considering the larger ones, even though their survival is nowhere discussed in Lindsay's
letter.
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employer if enacted:
[R]egarding the cost to employers if such legislation should be enacted, it would seem on the surface to be quite simple to calculate. The Bureau
of National Affairs has estimated it would cost
$320 billion nationwide for employers to implement a comparable worth program. A similar estimation for California employers (i.e., total number of women employed multiplied by an average
annual rated pay, subtracted from a similar calculation for men) would result in something
between $1 and $1.5 billion. These figures, however, are really quite meaningless and not even
germane to the issue. It might be more; it might
be less; it totally ignores administrative and enforcement costs . . . . Moreover, costs have never
been considered to be a legitimate excuse for discriminating actions that are proscribed by law
61

By presenting cumulative, nationwide costs, rather than a
realistic breakdown of the costs of actual comparable worth pay
scales, these writings project figures running into the billions.62
In effect, such literature emphasizes the disastrous effect comparable worth might have on the economy. Employers also tie com61. Letter from J. Arthur Lindsay to Christine Curtis, at 5 (December 28, 1984).
62. Id. at 5. But see Ramey, The Price of Equality, 4 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 27, 34
(Winter 1984), showing that comparable worth has to date cost employers in the public
sector only one to five percent of monies spent on personnel and one to two percent of
their whole budget. See also Rothchild, Overview of Pay Initiatives, 1974-1984, in 1
COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 119, 122·25 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984). In
Idaho, $7 million has been distributed in raises to the state's 8,700 classified employees.
Following a strike by San Jose, California city workers, $1.4 million has been allocated
over a two year period to supplement a 7.5% overall raise. In Minnesota $21.8 million
dollars (representing less than four percent of the state's payroll) was allocated over a
four year period. Costs of implementation to a small municipality might be even lower.
Princeton, Minnesota, for example, employs 33 workers. After the city created its own
job evaluation study, six employees were given raises to achieve pay equity. The city
spent only $10,000 or one-tenth of one percent of the city budget for both the study and
wage increase. Id. at 123.
As already noted, Lindsay's letter quoted Bureau of National Affairs figures estimating the nationwide costs of implementing comparable worth to be $320 billion. See Letter, supra note 61, at 4. Neither the letter, paper, nor any of the literature above provides any meaningful figures about what the yearly costs of implementing comparable
worth would be to a single company of a particular size. Id.
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parable worth to chaos in the workplace.63 Small-business men,
for example, first extol the "intimacy" existing between staff and
employer in a smaller workforce. They then predict that unrest
caused by "comparable worth" salaries would destroy the fabric
of that intimacy.64 Finally, certain words are often repeated in
management writings. The word "market," for example, is often
either itself repeated, or combined with the word "free" in an
attempt to remind readers that the survival of the "free market"
economy is at stake. 65
The effect on the courts has been twofold. First, most have
adopted the market defense as "given" rather than "suspect."
They have thus ruled a market-based wage gap outside the
scope of Title VII's remedial powers. 66 Second, courts have accepted a subtle but important language shift-one that emphasizes the costs of pay equity and ignores the effect of discriminatory pay gaps on workers. 67 That is, pay equity has virtually
disappeared as an issue, in cases where startling and acknowl63. Letter, supra note 60, at 4-7.
64. Id. But see Letter from Drucilla S. Ramey to Burk E. Deventhal, Esq., Office of
the City Attorney, San Francisco, at 2 (1983) (discussing the market and comparable
worth). Ms. Ramey observes that the enactment of "minimum wage laws, child labor
laws, occupational health and safety laws and ..• anti-discrimination laws ... [were]
all ... met with ... similar predictions of doom." Id. Critics of Massachusetts' child
labor act, for example, foretold that it would not only "drive employers from the state,
[but] destroy harmony between workers and management, and lead the country into
socialism." Id. at 2 (emphasis added); see also Freed & Polsby, infra note 87, at 1079
(citing Levin, Comparable Worth: The Feminist Road to Socialism, COMMENTARY 13
(Sept. 1984).
65. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Assoc. of Washington Business, AFSCME II, at
28.
Title VII was designed to further this policy and enhance the
free functioning of the employment market by removing discriminatory barriers. Congress' effort to unclog the flow of
market forces reflects it underlying confidence in the virtues of
a free market system. The district court's interpretation of Title VII, however, distorts the free market . ... Although the
fairness of the free market may be debated ... [it] is an economic reality . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. Sex discrimination has actual, calculable costs. For a survey of the growing literature on the subject, see Niemi, Sexist Earning Differences-The Cost of Female Sexuality, 36 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 39 (Jan. 1977). The authors argue that women get less value
for their education than men, with minority women getting the smallest returns for their
education.ld. See, e.g., Remick, The Comparable Worth Controversy, 10 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 371, 372 (1981).
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edged pay gaps exist. 68

V. PENETRATING THE MARKET DEFENSE
The market defense has specific strategic uses which remain
largely unexplored. 69 Moreover, neither the complex nature of
the marketplace nor the crucial role an equitable wage policy
plays in its intricate workings have been examined fully.70
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
69. See Risher, Job Evaluation: Problems and Prospects, 61 PERSONNEL 53 (1984).

Its generalities, for example, tend to obscure specific practices employers use to arrive at
wages. Job evaluation and its relation to market surveys offers an important example. It
illustrates that employers shape their companies by choosing among different courses of
action.Id.
Risher noted that job evaluation as such is "independent of the decisions that set
salaries ..• [because] •.. it focuses entirely on internal relative values without regard
to monetary considerations . • . [in establishing] what is in effect a hierarchy of jobs
within an organization." Id. at 53. He emphasized that not only do ways of conducting
job evaluations differ depending on the kind of job, but that "comparing [their] results
with existing pay rates •.. [results in] replic[ating] existing pay discrimination." Id. at
55.
A 1979 National Academy of Sciences study contained similar observations, noting
that current job evaluation methods have not kept up with the "advances in measurement in social sciences." Id. at 56. It recommended that further research be done to
modernize such techniques, but fell short of advocating the wholesale scrapping of some
systems or in favor of a single job evaluation system for the entire country. "[T]he report
... had a negligible impact on job evaluation practices ... [much to the relief of employers]." Id.
Risher's article also offers an excellent summary of how the methods of evaluating
lower paid positions and higher paid professional jobs differ. Id. at 57. Inexperienced
practitioners may also contribute to the problem. Risher notes that job evaluation is
normally considered an entry-level job by organizations. Id. at 58. See also Schwab, Using Job Evaluation to Obtain Pay Equity, in 1 COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's
83, 88 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984) (showing that job evaluation has a flexibility
which helps employers address external changes in the market); Steinberg, Identifying
Wage Discrimination and Implementing Pay Equity Adjustments, in 1 COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's 99, 102-03 (U.S. Civ. Rts. Comm. ed. 1984) (discussing differing methods of conducting job evaluations and how cultural assumptions may affect the
process); Beatty & Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems,
in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 59 (H. Remick ed. 1984). But cf. Remick, Dilemmas of Implementation: The Case of Nursing, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND
WAGE DISCRIMINATION 106 (H. Remick ed. 1984) for ways of constructing job evaluation
using comparable worth concepts and use of a "single bias-free point factor job evaluation system ... across job families both to rank-order jobs and set salaries . . . ." Id.
70. The first important factor is the continuing debate about the nature of the external market. The AFSCME II court calls the market a complex of forces which function according to the laws of supply and demand. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1406. Our
notions of the market, however, are based on neither laws nor forces but theoretical assumptions about how the Western economy functions, common to both "classical economy theory and neoclassical or marginal productivity theory . . . ." Schwab, supra note
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INTERNAL EQUITY

To compete, employers must attract and keep employees.
Wages play a central part in this process. 71 In this regard, wage
analysts have for many years stressed the value of "internal equity," the process of creating fair pay scales within an organization. 72 By motivating employers to work harder, equitable wages
69, at 84.
Contrary to such assumptions, however, a phenomenon known as the "balkanization
of markets" has been well documented. Id. Simply put, balkanization describes two
types of markets: those horizontally and vertically structured. In the former, employees
have a strong commitment to their occupation (e.g., construction trades, medical specialties, law and other professions). In the latter, however, a large number of jobs are specialized and unique to that firm only. Thus, only entry level positions pay according to
the external market. Id. For the other positions, there is essentially no external market
and "firms must find some alternative .•. for making wage setting decisions." Id. at 85.
The firm's discretion in manipulating wages is thus far greater with seniority and merit
systems playing an important part. Id. See also id. at 91 for a general bibliography on
the phenomenon of balkanization.
Personnel guides geared for use by management agree that "internal conditions require the employer to pay certain jobs above and below the market rate." 14 [Personnel
Manual) EMPL. COORDINATOR (RIA) 142,101 (Feb. 17, 1986). The same guide also cautions employers to define the market in which they are competing precisely, noting that
proper definition "will depend on the nature of the business and competition for labor in
the industry . . . ." Id.
71. See infra notes 72-73 for an indepth discussion.
72. Systems of compensation are, however, becoming more and more sophisticated.
Where it was formerly thought that structured pay raises motivated employees, personnel strategists now favor merit pay, which is an unstructured recognition of superior
performance. 1 [Compensation) HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (CCH) 11 10,356 (1983). The
change is based on the theory that raises serve only to "avoid dissatisfaction." Id.
"[O)nly when money is paid as a recognition for an individual's outstanding effort .•.
[and not) ... as a wage in disguise ... [do employees work harder)." Id.
Merit pay is becoming a pronounced feature of earnings generally, according to a
1985 survey of 875 firms across the country. Fifteen percent of the firms surveyed have
merit budgets that are larger than their competitors'. While inflation, collective bargaining agreements, and a concern for profits account for some of the rise, the chief reason
employers gave for enlarging such budgets was a desire to remain competitive in the
outside markets. Employer Compensation Practices Studied in Salary Planning Survey, 89 EMPL. ALERT (RIA), 4 (Nov. 15, 1984) Note that the market itself seems to reflect
the need for arriving at some form of internal wage equity, a process accomplished by
constant studies within a company. Wing, Achieving Internal Salary Equity Through
Job Management, in HANDBOOK OF WAGE AND SALARY ADMINISTRATION 2-19, 2-22 (M.
Rock ed. 1972). But see also Schwab, supra note 69, at 85. Deciding which employee has
performed above the norm can, however, be a much more subjective process than awarding structured raises, particularly in vertical markets where wages are not determined
from the outside except for entry level jobs. Id. Courts have recognized the danger by
requiring "notice to the affected parties, consistency, and objectivity [before they will
accept a) 'merit system' defense." Freed & Polsby, infra note 88, at 1094 (citing EEOC v.
Whitin Machine Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 1095, 1097-98 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1980); Brennan v.
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lead to superior performance which, in turn, raises the employer's ability to compete. 73 Maintaining pay equity has, in
fact, been a basic, accepted goal of personnel management since
World War II.74 One theorist, for example, commented that a
salary structure based on nothing more than a survey of the
market is an extremist rather than a typical approach to wagesetting.711 A dramatic example of the ineffectiveness of such pay
scales is the difficulty of finding nurses and clericals willing to
work for low wages in the early eighties. Although the pay offered was "competitive" with the external market, it was totally
ineffective in reducing the ~ritical shortage in both fields. 76
B.

TITLE

VII

LITIGATION AND WAGE POLICY CHANGES

Employers also show a puzzling ability to restructure wages
under a threat of costly "comparable worth" litigation. A warning to employers before the AFSCME II ruling advises:
"[C]aution: The comparable worth threat to market rate pay
systems is a point of vulnerability of potentially devastating disruption and expense. Facing this potential challenge, cautious
employers might consider instituting an internal mechanism for
measuring the relative worth of jobs."77 The warning appeared
in a policy guide tailored to a national audience. The same guide
suggested that employers limit job evaluation to smaller job
classes to protect themselves from comparable worth litigation.7s
Yet immediately following an Illinois ruling rejecting comparaVictoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Brookhaven
Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970); ct. 29 C.F.R. § 800.144 (1983) (an informal
or unwritten merit system may qualify under the statutory language if the standards or
criteria of the system are applied pursuant to an established plan, the essential terms of
which have been communicated to employees).
73. 1 [Compensation] HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. (CCH), supra note 72, at 1110,356.
The authors do, however, point out that during periods of inflation, wages paid in the
market may become more important than what is paid to fellow workers within a company, since buying power and survival in general are at stake. But when inflation slows,
employees are primarily interested in "what the person sitting next to them is earning."
ld. The point is that the buying power of the dollar, the market and the economy are
constantly changing and wage systems reflect those changes.
74.ld.
75. Wing, supra note 72, at 2-28 to -29.
76. Remick, supra note 67, at 372-74.
77. Job Evaluation, 14 [Personnel Manual] EMPL. COORDINATOR (RIA) 142,076
(April 1, 1984).
78.ld.
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ble worth, another such guide advised that conducting internal
job evaluation studies was safer. The same manual, however,
also warned about the continuing threat of AFSCME 1.79
Thus, litigation which presumably should have nothing
whatsoever to do with remaining competitive, is affecting employment wage strategies far more dramatically than any shifts
in the outside market. This suggests that the cost of lawsuits is
at least as important as the market in changing wage policy.80
Also, these manuals illustrate that wage setting is strategic
rather than passive, active rather than reactive.

C.

THE PITFALLS OF
DISCRIMINATION

USING

STATISTICS

TO

PROVE

WAGE

Ironically, plaintiffs have themselves contributed to the success of the "market defense" by an overwhelming reliance on
statistical evidence of wage discrimination. Because such evidence has become important to arguing Title VII cases, this dependence is understandable. 81 The chief drawback of such data,
however, is the tendency to stress end results rather than the
atmosphere in which an employer makes decisions. Nor can statistics capture the particular dynamics of the workplace in which
discrimination has occurred.82 One reason for this is that statistics work by inference rather than offering specific examples of
the phenomena they document. Statistics are therefore largely
incapable of isolating specific instances of wage discrimination.83
79. District Court Refuses to Extend Title VII to Cover Comparable Worth Claims,
12 EMPL. Alert (RIA) 2 (Apr. 18, 1985).
80. Personnel guides such as the above provide a wealth of material, generally focused on how to make personnel decisions that are litigation-proof. They thus provide
fertile ground for analysts interested in study of the strategic nature of wage setting.
81. D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION V, V (Supp. 1984).
The authors note that the importance of statistical proof has grown steadily between the
bringing of early Title VII litigation and present second-generation cases. Id. See also
infra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text. Despite its distrust of the statistics in the case
before it, the Spaulding court acknowledged their importance in employment discrimination cases generally although cautioning that they can be exaggerated and distorted.
Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 105 U.S.
511 (1984).
82. "[S]tatistics can provide powerful insight into general or long-run behavior but
as for a particular decision-and many cases are concerned with just one decision-at
best it can provide a presumption by inferring from the general to the particular." D.
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 81, at 5.
83. Multiple regression studies, which Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686, 704, favored, for
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Without such information, it is nearly impossible to determine
how an employer actually made decisions regarding wages. Although the gathering of statistics is becoming more sophisticated, their reliability remains at issue. 84
The Ninth Circuit has, in fact, noted its distrust of statistical evidence in proving intentional discrimination under Title
VII. 85 The court has asked Title VII litigants for current
ho]examples of discriminatory treatment, refusing to accept historical patterns of discrimination as sufficient.88 Plaintiffs will
thus have to put more effort into gathering testimonial evidence
in any case.87 The sooner such efforts begin, the more likely
plaintiffs are to defeat the market defense.
Plaintiffs might find the latter approach rewarding for two
other reasons. Both American and European theorists have
noted that as governments introduce equal pay legislation, occuexample, are constructed so that the basic premises (lower wages paid to one sex than
those paid another) are tested by the injection of numerous variables such as qualifications, education, etc., which could have legitimately accounted for the inequity. Presumably any remaining gap is unexplained and hints strongly that discriminatory treatment
is responsible. Fisher, supra note 54, at 722-24. Notice, then, that actual testimony of
employees, memoranda, or other evidence of actual company policy is never examined in
such studies.
84. See Spaulding at 740 F.2d at 704 (citing Fisher, supra note 54, at 702-05). See
also infra note 87 discussing some potential sources of unreliability.
85. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407.
86. Id. at 1407-08.
87. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, Comparable Worth in the Equal Pay Act, 51 U. CHL
L. REV. 1078, 1081-99 (1984), for a novel approach. While the authors' perspective is a
conservative one, critical of comparable worth, their methodology may interest advocates
of pay equity. But cf. Becker, Comparable Worth in Antidiscrimination Legislation: A
Reply to Freed and Polsby, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1112 (1984). The authors show that it is
possible to focus on employers' actual decisions rather than trends. Instead of limiting
themselves to case law or numerical information, they imagine hypothetical scenarios in
which an advertising executive contemplates paying a female employee less than a male.
The authors then show the various possibilities underlying the employer's decision (some
discriminatory, some not). The point is to try to capture the "sense" of the decision,
rather than just the fact that it was made.
A telling example of the limits of statistics the authors give is the paradox of "[a]
statistical [result that] indicates that the difference in average salary between men and
women is explained completely by differences in such factors as education and experience." Id. at 1099. "[Despite this exonerating data, however] the employer does not consciously set salaries on the basis of such factors, but rather proceeds on the basis of
unstructured, unsystematic reactions [or 'gut feelings'] to various employees' qualifications and productivity." Id. Although his real motivation would fail as a defense, statistical analysis saves him by not being able to tell the difference.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3

492

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:475

pational segregation increases.88 Apparently this occurs because
as blatant pay inequity becomes extinct, other discriminatory
practices arise such as sex-biased job hiring, promotion and job
classification. While all such practices result in a wage gap, they
are increasingly more elusive than an outright wage discrepancy.89 One could, of course, consider the market defense just
such a policy.
Thus, considering pay equity and remedies such as comparable worth apart from other employment practices gives a
highly inaccurate picture of the issues involved. In some of the
more recent "pay inequity" cases for example, plaintiffs have
also alleged other forms of sex discrimination.90 Stressing the
presence of such practices may be key to better understanding
the strategic uses of the market defense.
VI. THE BOHM V. HARTZ DISSENT: PROVING SEX DISCRIMINATION THROUGH AN IMMERSION IN THE
WORKPLACE

A.

THE WORKPLACE

One of the few judicial attempts to focus in detail on the
workplace in which a pay dispute involving a market survey
arose is a dissenting opinion in Bohm v. Hartz Wholesale Manufacturing CO.,91 a recent Minnesota Court of Appeals decision.
The defendant, L.B. Hartz Wholesale is a grocery wholesale
business located in Thief River Falls, Minnesota. By 1980, Hartz
had employed 125 men and seventeen women. That same year,
the company conducted a market salary survey which revealed
that its male warehouse workers were underpaid compared to
88. Johung, Patterns of Occupational Segregation by Sex in the Labor Market, in
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT POL-

44 (G. Schmid & R. Weitzel eds. 1984).
89. See, e.g., Spaulding, 704 F.2d at 706 (citing Bryant v. Int'l Schools Services,
Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 565 (3d Cir. 1982) ("challenge to policy giving unequal employment
benefits to people hired to work in Iran ..."».
90. See, e.g., Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984»;
Taylor v. Charly Brothers, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n of Portland, 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Ore. 1983).
91. Bohm v. L.B. Hartz Wholesale Corp., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 495
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
ICY
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the average wage for such positions. 92 The survey also showed
that Hartz's unskilled clericals were paid wages higher than the
market norm. Annual raises were then adjusted downward to
5.97 percent for the latter category, consisting of fourteen
women. 93 The women worked in five separate departments of
the company in jobs ranging from clerk-typist to secretary, accounting clerk and bookkeeper. 94
Hartz's non-clerical staff received raises as high as twenty
percent. All but four of these employees were male. Although
most worked in Hartz's warehouse assembling, loading and delivering groceries to retailers, some had clerical duties very similar to those held by thirteen out of the seventeen female
employees. Yet all 125 men were either classified as warehouse
workers or given special exempt classifications. 9 !>
When Reva Bohm, a female clerical worker affected by the
pay cut, publicly protested the wage adjustments, she was
92. ld. at 496.
93. ld. The survey showed Hartz's clerical workers were earning $6.92 per hour.
Clericals employed by two other area wholesalers, however, were being paid $6.09 and
$6.04 per hour. The area's average hourly wage for clericals was determined to be somewhere between $4.34 and $4.78 by-an earlier state survey. ld. The hourly wage of order
pickers and truck drivers working in Hartz's warehouse was $8.46 and $9.06 respectively.
Warehouse workers at one area facility earned $9.51. At another they made $8.52 per
hour. Truck drivers working for the same two employers earned $9.86 and $8.82 hourly.
ld.
94. ld. at 502 (Crippen, J. t dissenting). The plaintiff's range of duties contradict the
notion that she was unskilled. Mter graduating from high school and completing a yearlong secretarial course, the plaintiff, Reva Bohm, was hired as a keypunch operator by
Hartz in August 1975. From 1976 to March 1981, when she was fired, Bohm worked in
Hartz's computer and billing or data processing department. There she helped prepare
master sheets showing routes, deliveries, loadweights and trucks used and kept records of
the truckers' mileage and hours. In addition, she filed and answered phones. ld. The four
women not included in the "unskilled clericals" category were classified as junior buyer
(1), computer operator (2) and "clerical"(l). Their average hourly wage was $7.33. None
of the four earned as much as any of Hartz's male employees. The two fulltime computer
operators earned $2.27 an hour less than Hartz's lowest paid male employees. No female
at Hartz was a salaried employee; twenty males were salaried. ld. at 502-03.
95. Two males, for example, worked with the plaintiff in the computer and billing
department. Their jobs included clerical duties, although not identical to the plaintiff's.
Yet, one man was classified as a "merchandise shipper." The other was classified as a
"merchandise receiver." Both were thus exempted from the unskilled clerical class. ld. at
502. In 1980 these two employees were already earning $2.46 an hour more than the
female "unskilled clericals." The 1981 wage increases promised them a 9.9% increase,
more than two times the raises the women were to receive. ld. at 502-08.
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fired. 9S Despite these documented practices, the trial court concluded that Hartz had not discriminated against its female employees on the basis of sex. The court also rejected the plaintiff's
comparable worth claim under Title VII and found that her firing was not retaliatory. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed. 97
Whether through reluctance or an inability to grasp the significance of key facts before it, the Bohm majority refused to
stray from the surface issues in the case. The court concluded,
that since Bohm had not filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint until a month after her dismissal,
her firing could not have been retaliatory.9s Bohm's repeated
public protests to her supervisor well before the firing, however,
went unnoticed by the court.99
There were also glaring signs that the defendant's job
classifications were discriminatory. The clerical category, which
was made up entirely of women and included jobs ranging from
clerk-typist to bookkeeper appeared particularly specious. Men
working in jobs almost identical to the plaintiff's were classified
as "merchandise shipper" and "receiver." Yet the court refused
to examine either category closely. Instead, the court found for
the defendants, after a cursory discussion of existing job pat96. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 497. See also infra note 98 for a more
extensive discussion.
97. Id. at 497-501. Bohn, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 500-01.
98. Bohm filed a sex discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on April 4, 1981. She had been fired in March of that year. Id. at 497. The
majority concluded that since Hartz did not receive notice of her charges until some time
after April 4, her firing could not have been retaliatory. Id. at 498.
99. Id. at 500. In contrast, the dissent refused to limit itself to the sequence of the
two events. It looked instead at the atmosphere existing at Hartz before the firing. Its
detailed portrait of the tensions the 1981 market survey produced among employees and
management captured the underlying flavor of events leading to Bohm's firing, as no
statistical study ever could. Id. at 503 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The seven employees of
the computer and billing department were informed of the 1981 wage increases at a department meeting held in their supervisor's office in December 1980. The plaintiff protested to her boss immediately following the announcement. Id. "You can't do that," she
told her supervisor. Id. She also pointed out that the planned increases would enlarge an
already existing wage gap between male and female members of the department. Id.
Following the meeting, she approached her supervisor several more times asking if she
could speak to Hartz's Board of Directors. According to Bohm, the Board was never
informed of her wishes. Id. The majority itself admits that "[tJwo months after she confronted Olson," her hours were cut. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 497. One
month later she was fired. Id.
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terns in Minnesota/ oo and an unquestioning belief in the legitimacy of Hartz's market survey. Not surprisingly, the court also
refused to relate the survey to other actions of the defendant. lol
The dissent responded by noting that the trial court had
made two major errors. I02 First, it had misinterpreted the scope
of Title VII's powers, believing the statute required allegations
of unequal pay for equal work. los Second, the trial court had
mistakenly concluded that Hartz's market survey could legitimize discriminatory patterns evident in its wage practices. lo4
100. [d. at 498. The majority's superficial analysis of these two issues was typical of
its approach throughout the opinion. Echoing the testimony of a state expert on job
patterns in northwest Minnesota, the majority concluded the region's workforce was segregated by choice. Ninety to ninety-two percent of the area's clerical applicants were
women but almost none applied for warehouse positions. [d. at 498. To the majority, the
above also explained why no women at Hartz, including Bohm, had ever applied to
transfer to its warehouses, once hired. [d. The latter conclusion is striking given the
majority's own admission that Hartz's seniority system was structured to deprive any
employee transferring to any seniority benefits they had acquired. [d. "[The seniority
system] ... is ... [one] agreed I,lpon by the majority of employees, presumably to
perpetuate the autonomy of individual departments," the court stated. [d. (emphasis
added). Note that in 1980, Hartz employed 125 men and 17 women. [d. at 496. Thus,
even had all 17 women disapproved of the seniority system and voted to change it, they
could never have come near the majority required. The majority also found that even
were Hartz's seniority system discriminatory, Bohm had not been harmed as a result,
since she had never requested a transfer to the higher-paying warehouse jobs. [d. at 499
(emphasis added).
101. As with Hartz's seniority system, the majority found legitimate reasons for
Bohm's dismissal; it was simply the result of necessary economic cutbacks, following the
loss of three large grocery accounts. [d. at 503 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The majority
also found the legitimacy of using market factors in setting wages solidly grounded in the
usual cluster of "market defense" cases. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 50001. It concluded there was no pattern of intentional discrimination by the defendants.
[d.
102. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 506 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
103. Because of its belief that Title VII does not encompass claims of unequal pay
for differing jobs performed by men and women "the court may have failed to recognize
a lawful basis for any discrimination claim ••.. " [d. at 504. County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), of course, established otherwise, according to the dissent.
Even before Gunther, the dissent noted, the "equal pay/equal work" doctrine never existed for cases of discrimination on the basis of race or religion." Bohm, 38 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 504 (Crippen, J., dissenting) (citing International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.
1980). The dissent considered Westinghouse a precursor to Gunther. Bohn, 38 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 504 (Crippen, J., dissenting). Gunther's role was to clarify
that already prohibited discriminatory wage practices based on race or religion were also
prohibited on the basis of sex. Thus, the Bennett Amendment's limited function in Title
VII cases was for the first time established. [d. See also supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
104. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 506-07 (Crippen, J., dissenting). To

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3

496

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:475

The dissent, however, found that unless a defendant could justify the taking of a market survey by some business necessity,
the presence of a survey heightened the suspicion that other discriminatory practices had also occurred. lo5 Bearing out this theory, the dissent linked the Hartz survey to a variety of other
suspect practices taken by the defendant. lOS
In the dissent's view, the "unskilled clericals" category into
which Hartz had placed most of its female employees, was overbroad, including females with varying skills in a wide range of
duties. lo7 The defendant's only purpose in establishing the category had been to create wage disparity between male and female
employees. lOS In addition, the 1981 wage increases had clearly
affected men differently than women. Even before 1981, all of
Hartz's female employees were being paid less than its .male
workers.lo9 Moreover, when the plaintiff protested these practices, she was fired. Her firing was relevant not only to the issue
of retaliatory discharge, but increased the evidence of the defendant's discriminatory wage practices. llo Essentially, Hartz's
market survey had only one purpose: to put a ceiling on the already inequitable wages paid to Hartz's female employees.l l l
the dissent, the circumstances in which a market survey is taken, rather than its results,
are the crucial thing to examine in Title VII cases. The point is that while some market
surveys are legitimately used by employers to set competitive salaries, many are taken to
legitimize already existing and suspect wage disparity. [d. At Hartz, "susnect job classifications, the firing of an objector and wage disparities for all women ... [accompanied
Hartz's wage setting practices] . . . . [T]he evidence [also] showed that market information had nothing to do with •.. the firing decision. Likewise, the market does not explain disparate 1981 raises for female and male clerical workers." [d. at 507.
105. Id. at 508.
106. Id. at 502-03.
107. "The category of 'unskilled clericals' is a specious device that serves to limit
wages for women; it is 'transparently' discriminatory." [d., at 505 (citing Gunther, 452
U.S. at 179). See also supra note 95.
108. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 497-500; see also id. at 505 (Crippen,
J., dissenting).
109. [d. at 502-05.
110. [d. at 505-06. Note that for the dissent, one fact, such as Bohm's dismissal, may
'raise numerous issues, each of which are linked to the other. The importance of this
approach is two-fold. First, the connections that different pieces of evidence have to each
other are stressed, thus enriching the picture of the workplace. Second, the question of a
plaintiff's potential damages is addressed much more carefully. The dissent would, for
example, have awarded Bohm damages to remedy the discriminatory wage gap she had
protested. Id. at 506. But it would also have given a separate and potentially greater
award for the retaliatory discharge itself. [d.
111. A Hartz official testified that its market survey showed a wage "ceiling" had
been reached for the "unskilled clericals" category. [d. at 503. But the defendants pre-
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The plaintiff had therefore presented a prima facie case of both
intentional sex-based dlscrimination and retaliatory discharge,
neither of which the defendant had rebutted.ll2

B.

LIMITING THE "MARKET DEFENSE"

The dissent also severely criticized the "market defense" itself for making cases like Bohm possible.ll 3 By providing a seemingly rational basis for suspect wage practices, the dissent concluded, market factors act as a convenient screen for employers
like Hartz.ll4 More important, constant reference to the
marketplace also distorts Title VII's broad remedial powers. m
Ground newly gained in County of Washington v. Gunther is
thus lost to plaintiffs, with devastating results. ll6
sent no evidence showing that the ceiling had any legitimate business purpose. Id. at
508-09 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The only other employees on whose wages a ceiling was
placed were two of Hartz's top salaried officers. Id. at 508. Thus, "market information
was used to shape ... an inequitable lid on the wages for one class of employees," the
dissent concluded. Id.
112. Id. at 506. See also supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. A vigorous debate currently exists as to what constitutes a prima facie Title VII ease. Id.
113. Id. The dissent focused its criticism on Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th
Cir. 1977), but the group of Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases, including Lemons v. City and
County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 888 (1980) and
Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 105 U.S. 511
(1984), also came under its attack. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 508 (Crippen, J., dissenting). The dissent's main point was that County of Washington v. Gunther,
452 U.S. 161 (1981), decided four years after Christensen and one year after Lemons,
made the reasoning of the latter "obsolete." Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 507
(Crippen, J., dissenting). Since "any wage inequality among those in different job categories can normally be explained by reference to the market." Gunther would become moot
were such unqualified references allowed. Id. (emphasis added). Christensen was also
distinguishable on its facts in that there the defendant did not use suspect criteria in
setting wages. Id. (citing Christensen, 563 F.2d at 354).
114. Market information simply failed to account for the defendant's numerous suspect actions in Bohm, according to the dissent. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
507 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 507-08. Although Bohm was analyzed by both the majority and the dissent under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, id. at 498-500, the statute is commonly
construed by applying the principles developed in Title VII litigation. See MINN. STAT. §
363.03(2) (1984). See also id. at 501-07 (Crippen, J., dissenting). Moreover, Title VII's
broad purpose of ending discrimination is also in direct conflict with exonerate defendants who can point to the marketplace to explain discriminatory wage practices that
"'reflect' the social or economic practices in the community," according to the dissent.
Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 507 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
116. Errors of analysis, such as those made by both the trial court and the majority
in Bohm would cut off any remedy to plaintiffs with valid causes of action under Title
VII. Id. at 509.
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For these reasons, the dissent proposed severely limiting the
"market defense" in two ways. In disparate impact claims, the
dissent would require that defendants show a legitimate business need for the use of market factors to justify otherwise discriminatory wage practices. ll7 Second, it would require a much
more thorough probing of any justification offered by a Title VII
defendant for an apparent sex-based wage gap.1l8
The dissent's final insight was its most innovative. According to the dissent, the Gunther decision, establishing that Title
VII actions may include allegations of unequal pay for different
work, opened new territory that falls somewhere between an acceptance of "pure" comparable worth and the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work. 1l9 Cases arising in this unexplored area call
for rigorous, individualized analysis. This is particularly true
when, as in Bohm, an employer has set wages without using any
.
objective criteria.120
But the dissent also warned plaintiffs to stop clinging to the
comparable worth banner. The dissent instead urged plaintiffs
to point to specific discriminatory practices by the employer
when alleging wage discrimination. 121 The Bohm dissent, therefore, provides the first judicial suggestion of how to break
through the tangle of rhetoric surrounding the comparable
worth issue. 122 For the first time, the market defense is firmly
117. Id. at 507 (citing Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 468 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1984». To the dissent, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), was the key
to examining disparate impact claims. Under Griggs, any practice which though neutral
on its face has a discriminatory impact is forbidden unless a defendant can show a specific necessity for it. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 507 (Crippen, J., dissent, ing) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424». In Craik, the defendant was able to make such a
showing; all male job categories given wage increases were shown to be ones for which it
was very difficult to recruit properly qualified staff). Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 507 (citing Craik, 31 F.2d at 465).
118. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 508 (Crippen, J., dissenting) (citing
Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 402 n.3 (1979».
119. Bohm, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 509 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
120.Id.
121. Id.
122. One of the greatest stumbling blocks to separating out the legitimate uses of
market factors to structure wages from ones which are a pretext for wage discrimination
is the overwhelming amount of rhetoric both sides in the comparable worth debate have
thrown at the courts. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion.
Courts have perpetuated the problem by paying a parrot-like homage to the language of
the briefs they favor. The author examined a series of amicus briefs filed with the Ninth
Circuit which the AFSCME II court considered in writing its opinion. Their advocacy
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linked to other discriminatory practices by the kind of objective
analysis courts have repeatedly asked for in this area.
VI. A NOTE ON SAN FRANCISCO AND COMPARABLE
WORTH: A COMPARISON WITH AFSCME
On November 5, 1985, the City of San Francisco's voters became the first in the country to defeat comparable worth on the
ballot. 123 Proposition E asked voters to repeal a city ordinance
granting a five-dollar-a-day "meal allowance" to 7,000 of the
city's lowest paid workers,124 predominantly women and
minorities. 125 Dianne Feinstein, San Francisco's current mayor,
simply found its way undigested into the court's decision. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Ass'n
of Washington Business, at 28, AFSCME II; AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1407-08. The
AFSCME I court was also guilty of forsaking factual analysis for rhetoric. Although its
passion is a welcome element in addressing pay inequity, the court could clearly have
done a better job in marshalling the many factual details presented to it by both the
plaintiffs. By not doing so, the earlier court left itself open to the AFSCME II court's
charges that the plaintiffs had presented only "isolated incidents of sex segregation as
evidence of a history of sex-based wage discrimination." AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 140708 (citing AFSCME I, 568 F. Supp. at 860). The plaintiffs had, in fact, presented a detailed portrait of Washington's discriminatory practices beginning at the turn of the century up to and including the Willis studies, Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 10-11,
AFSCME II (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985). Also crucial to their case was ample evidence that
the defendants did not use the results of their own market surveys in structuring wages.
Id. at i. Incredibly, the AFSCME I court failed to include this evidence in its finding for
the plaintiffs. AFSCME I, 568 F. Supp. at 860; see also AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 140506.
123. The November fifth city ballot was part of a state-wide election held in 1985.
Seven propositions, including Proposition E, were presented to San Francisco voters for
their approval or rejection. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1985, at I, col. 5.
124. San Francisco, Cal., Proposition E (Nov. 1985), read in pertinent part:
Section 1. Ordinance No. 170-85, Part II. Salary Standardization Ordinance for Fiscal Year 1985-86, providing a meal allowance for certain City Employees, is hereby repealed. In doing so, the People of San Francisco reaffirm and recognize that
the City and County of San Francisco may not provide any
compensation to its employees for services rendered except
under the San Francisco Charter Sections 8.401 et seq. Any
reserve of monies designated to implement a meal allowance
or other premium payments not authorized by Ordinance No.
164-85 Part I shall be rescinded.
Id.
125. The 13 city classes selected to receive the meal allowance were composed of
female and minority dominated staff earning less than $26,000 a year. Walsh, The Comparable Worth Conundrum, San Francisco Bay Guardian, Oct. 16, 1985, at 11, col. 2.
They included the following job classifications: clerk stenographer; data entry operator;
licensed vocational nurse; food service workers; dietition; laundry workers, eligibility
worker, social worker; librarian and health worker I-IV. Position Paper from the offices
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placed the measure on the ballot on June 27, 1985.126 Her decision ;followed a series of events whose often incomprehensible
twists and turns are typical of high stakes political
maneuvering. 127
At first glance, the city's ballot controversy has little in
common with Washington's drawn-out court battles. Yet, the inequitable wage practices out of which both controversies grew
show a striking similarity. So similar is wage policy in the two
jurisdictions that it raises the likelihood of certain endemic patterns of wage discrimination being common to the public sector
as a whole. 128 Even more troubling is the relation of these
of the Hon. Nancy Walker (Sept. 21, 1985) (discussing Pay Equity History and the
Memorandum of Understanding reached between the City and SEIU on May 13, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Position Paper]. See also infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
126. The initiative was placed on the City Ballot by Dianne Feinstein, San Francisco's current Mayor, on June 27, 1985.
127. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
128. A recent class action suit brought by the California State Employees Association as well as various individual employees against the State of California offers further
proof of discriminatory patterns common to the public sector. The suit is still in the
discovery phase. Thus the entire range and variety of the discriminatory practices the
plaintiffs allege is not entirely clear. .
In their Statement of Factual and Legal Theories presented to the district court in
support of class certification, the plaintiffs put forth allegations already fanllliar from the
two AFSCME suits and the ongoing controversy in San Francisco. First, the plaintiffs
alleged that the "[d]efendants do not now and never have followed the 'market' in setting wage rates." California State Employees' Association v. California, No. C-84-7275
MHP 1, 2 n.2. (N.D. Cal. filed May 30, 1985) [hereinafter cited as CSEA]. Second, they
recited a series of alleged State practices that are almost identical to those practiced in
Washington. They include the segregation of California's workforce using "sex-segregated . . . ads, job bulletins, as well as discriminatory restrictions on promotions and
transfers . . . ." Id. at 1. As had happened in Washington, an official report to the State
Legislature found an estimated wage gap of 22% to 26% between the State's male and
female dominated job classes. Id. at 6 (citing Report of the Senate Office of Research
(1984». As in Washington, this report recommended that further study be undertaken to
determine how pay equity could be achieved for the State's workforce. CSEA at 1. In
1984, the Legislature voted to appropriate $77 million for the express purpose of eliminating sex-based wage discrimination but the Governor vetoed both the appropriation
and 1981 legislation (SB 1701) which would have created a Pay Equity Commission to
determine specifically which female-dominated job classes are undervalued. Id.
In certifying the class, Judge Marilyn Patel ruled that the AFSCME II decision does
not preclude causes of action brought under Title VII which allege intentional wage discrimination even though such discrimination may have had its origin "in market
rates." Memorandum and Order Granting Conditional Class Certification, CSEA at
27 n.l. (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 1985) (emphasis in original). Judge Patel noted that
"[d]iscriminatory motive is the very evil to which Title VII is directed. While plaintiffs
may have a difficult time establishing intent, they have made sufficient allegations enabling them to try." Id. That is, the fact that a defendant's discriminatory motive is
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patterns to the market defense. Recent data show that while
both jurisdictions justify an admitted wage can affecting certain
job classes by point to market forces, neither sector actually follows the market in setting salaries. 129 In short, both jurisdictions
currently use the market defense as a pretext for widespread
wage discrimination. A detailed examination of the criteria both
the City of San Francisco and Washington State traditionally
use reveals how these discriminatory practices have evolved.

A.

INDEXING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Theoretically, the first step in setting wages in both jurisdictions is a process called benchmarking. Benchmarking is a selection of key job classes within certain occupations. These classes
are then surveyed in the market. The survey establishes what
employers in the area are paying for each class. This gives an
employer a detailed salary range to choose from in paying his or
her own workers.13o
In practice, however, most wages are not set by benchmarking. Instead, a process called indexing is most frequently used. 131
Indexing is a clustering of jobs around a benchmark classification. Its primary purpose in both jurisdictions is to reproduce an
internal alignment in each department or agency. The pay for an
indexed job results from comparing it to what is paid for a
benchmark position. But the recommended salary for the former
may vary dramatically from that paid its benchmark.132 Washrooted in the market defense does not by itself take his or her actions outside the scope
of Title VII. Id. The parties filed a preliminary statement to a joint status conference on
March 17, 1986.Id. The plaintiff reiterated a request to conduct a six-month "comparable worth" job evaluation which included a request to observe classified employees at
work.ld. at 8. The state declared an intent "to seek a definitive ruling" on the viability
of comparable worth and the use of disparate impact to show wage discrimination under
Title VII. Id. at 3. Given AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1401, American Nurse's Ass'n v.
Illinois, No. 85-1766 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 1986) and the instant case, the CSEA outcome
promises to both test and shape future Title VII litigation. See also 1 California Women
1, 3 (California Comm'n on the Status of Women ed. 1986) (summarizing the Task
Force's majority and minority reports on comparable worth and job class studies).
129. See infra notes 130-42 and accompanying text for an extended discussion.
130. Appellee's Brief at 27, AFSCME II; Report of the Service Employees International Union-City Committee on Comparable Worth to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Phase One 1, 21 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter cited as SEIU Report].
131. Appellee's Brief at 27, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 21.
132. Appellee's Brief at 27-30, AFSCME II. "[T]he ... recommended salary for the
'indexed' job may be set above, below or at the same level as the selected benchmark."
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ington sets ninety-seven percent of its salaries by indexing. San
Francisco derives ninety-five percent of its wages the same way.
In practice, then, market salaries are largely irrelevant to the
wage-setting process. Hence both jurisdictions virtually ignore
them. l33
B.

UNWRITTEN DISCRETION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Without the check of the outside market, salaries are left to
be set using discretionary and often irrational customs deeply
rooted within each department or agency. Almost nothing exists
in writing, either in San Francisco or in Washington, setting
standards or even guidelines to be used either in indexing jobs
or in benchmarking. Instead, Washington's personnel boards
and San Francisco's Civil Service Commission routinely adjust
or abolish benchmarks altogether. l34 They also remove and add
jobs clustered around a benchmark. l3 C> Wages paid for several
benchmark jobs are also averaged to arrive at salaries. In Washington, where two personnel boards conduct separate indexing
procedures, the same jobs may often be indexed to different
benchmarks. l3s Finally, both Washington and San Francisco
have wide discretion in deciding whether or not to refer to market rates for the few jobs they have surveyed. 137

In San Francisco, the City Charter mandates an annual salId. at 27 SEIU Report, supra note 129, at 21-27.
133. Appellee's Brief at 25-35, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 21. In
San Francisco, only 60 out of 1600 benchmark classes are even surveyed in the market.
SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 21. In Washington, "indexing" takes place well before
any market surveys are conducted to prevent market'rates from influencing the process.
Appellee's Brief at 27, AFSCME II. In San Francisco, the relation between indexed jobs
and the market is more complex. "[Indexed] classifications determined to be out of
alignment, based either on the internal market (salary relationships between jobs within
the city) or the external market ... may be moved to a new place on the benchmark or
reallocated to a different [one] . . . ." SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 22.
134. Appellee's Brief at 30-35, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 16, 20,
23.
135. Appellee's Brief at 30, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 24-25.
136. Appellee's Brief at 28, AFSCME II. This is true for more than one third of all
jobs existing at the two Boards. For example, while DOP pilots are "indexed to the Automotive Mechanic benchmark ... [HEPB pilots are indexed] to the Research Technologist benchmark." Id. Each benchmark pays a different salary. Id.
137. Appellee's Brief at 28, AFSCME II. Deviations from market rates also occur to
preserve historical and internal relationships, within the two state agencies. Id. SEIU
Report, supra note 130, at 22.
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ary standardization process using strict formulae based on like
work and service. Nevertheless, the city's Civil Service Commission routinely refers to wages being paid in other jurisdictions
before deciding its own departments' salaries. Commission staff
also compares wages earned by certain city classes to classes in
other city departments, adjusting salaries accordingly while apparently ignoring charter formulae. 13s
In both jurisdictions, the foregoing practices perpetuate blatantly sex-based wage gaps. At least some of these gaps result
from indexing female dominated jobs to female benchmarks and
male to male. 139 The AFSCME plaintiffs uncovered startling applications of this policy. It would seem logical, for example, for
Washington to index the predominantly female Campus Police
Assistant classification to the Security Guard benchmark. But
since the latter is a predominantly male benchmark class earning a higher salary, Washington instead indexes the Campus Police Assistants to a clerical benchmark also predominantly female. Even more startling is the fact that State Beauticians are
indexed to the same benchmark as State Barbers, ranked two
pay ranges below the Barber class; this results in an unexplained
pay gap that is totally arbitrary.14o
Similar indexing maneuvers occur in San Francisco. 141 The
most interesting and subtle technique is the Multiple Benchmark System for the city's executives. By tying about 150 top
positions to several city benchmarks instead of just one, and
averaging the wage earned by each, the city again arbitrarily
succeeds in raising a few chosen salaries. Seventy-five percent of
these officials are men. Ninety-five percent are white. 142
C.

THE POLITICS OF KEEPING THE PEACE

Many of the wage practices just detailed have been aptly
described as ways of "keep[ing] the peace" within the public
sector.143 Achieving peace is, however, an intensely political pro138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 22-23.
Appellee's Brief at 29, AFSCME II; SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 26.
Appellee's Brief at 29, AFSCME II.
SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 26.
Id. at 26-28.
Appellee's Brief at 29, AFSCME II.
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cess in both jurisdictions. In Washington, the "politics" of adjusting salaries commences as soon as the preliminary internal
adjustment described above ends and staff have reported to personnel board members. Almost immediately a variety of groups
approach the board, lobbying its members to drop certain
benchmarks, select others and raise salaries of various indexed
jobs.u 4 Board members, all political appointees, also trade votes
with one another in deciding which indexed positions deserve
raises:
One former Board member testified that Board
members swapped votes on decisions to deviate
from the survey, promising support from one job
rate in return for support for another . . . one
Board member supported an increase for dental
hygienists because his daughter-in-law was a dental hygienist and worked hard . . . .145

In San Francisco, too, employers, unions, city departments
and even other members of the city's civil service approach the
Commission's staff all seeking various wage adjustments for certain job classes. About forty to fifty such requests are implemented annually.146
Although this Comment has focused on the politics occurring at the administrative level, elected officials in both jurisdictions are involved, thereby increasing political pressures to adjust salaries. Washington personnel boards are empowered to
make salary recommendations only some of which the State
Legislature may choose to enact. Once this body receives the
board's recommendations, therefore, a second round of lobbying
begins, this time directed at legislators. In its "cost-justification
defense" in AFSCME I, the State presented some evidence of
the scope of such lobbying efforts in the years immediately prior
to the AFSCME decision. 147 The State cited promises to the forest industry and its Prison Boards..
144. Id. at 30. "[O]rganizations' ... manager[s] ... and classified employees" are
all free to ask for additional salary adjustments at public hearings held by both Boards.
Each may then adopt any changes suggested or propose salaries of its own. Id. at 30.
145. Id. at 31.
146. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 24.
147. AFSCME I, 568 F. Supp. at 867.
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State officials emphasized budgetary promises to ensure adequate delivery of social services and education to its residents.148 The State also expressed great concern for achieving a
balanced budget and predicted unrest among employees resulting from the Willis studies.149 The State saw the fiscal priorities
as more important than achieving pay equity for its own
workforce.
D.

SAN FRANCISCO: THE CITY CHARTER,

"MEAL

ALLowANCES"

AND COMPARABLE WORTH

In 1984, one could not have predicted that a year later the
city's voters would repeal a comparable worth ordinance passed
by the city's Board of Supervisors. llSo Nor could anyone have
guessed that Dianne Feinstein, the city's mayor, would be the
one to place the repeal initiative on the ballot.11S1
By 1984, two studies had already been conducted showing
the high level of job segregation, both by sex and by race, that
existed among city and county employees. 11S2 Feinstein responded sympathetically, for the first time supporting city and
union negotiators attempting to draft a pay schedule based on
comparable worth principles for all city employees. 11S3 She appointed a task force to advise her on pay equity issues.154 At an
148. That court found all just justifications to be "without merit." [d.
149. [d. But see Letter, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 158-59 and
accompanying text.
151. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE
170-85 (1985-86) (Part II, Salary Standardization Ordinance, repealed 1985) provided a
five-dollar-a-day meal allowance to 7,000 City workers (predominantly minority and
women).
152. See SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 12 (citing WOMEN LmRARY WORKERS'
STUDY, COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1978»; see also SEIU Report, supra note
130, at 13-15 (citing SAN FRANcIsco COMPARABLE WORTH COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS' LEGISLATIVE AND PERSONNEL COMMITTEE (1981». The 1978 study
found that workers in predominantly male classifications earned approximately 74%
more per month than those in predominantly female ones. SEIU Report, supra note 130,
at 12. "[Sixty-nine percent] of city job classifications had no female incumbents ..•.
[T]he 1981 Report cited similar patterns, noting that earnings of women and minorities
were depressed further by their disproportionate representation among temporary employees . . . .n [d. at 14.
153. 'See SEIU Report, supra note 130 at 1 app.B (citing OFFICE OF THE MAyoR, SAN
FRANCISCO, POSITION ON EQUAL PAY FOR COMPARABLE WORTH (1984».
154. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 1. See also OFFICE OF CONTROLLER, SAN FRAN-
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annual Conference of Mayors, Feinstein successfully lobbied
fellow delegates for an endorsement of comparable worth at the
national level. l55 Her efforts gave her new credibility as a feminist. 156 Since then, however, she and the city's Board of Supervisor's have been deadlocked in a public and increasingly bitter
controversy about how to implement comparable worth.
Unlike the legal battle in Washington, which focused on the
Legislature's actions, the San Francisco disagreement is based
on varying interpretations of the City Charter. It revolves
around the ability of the Kleh Actl57 to override the Charter by
creating a legislative mandate to set municipal and county salaCISCO, COMPARABLE WORTH ESTIMATES 1, 2 (Sept. 7, 1984) (acknowledging significant
wage disparities but concluding that the cost of full implementation of comparable worth
will make achieving parity difficult).
155. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 1 app. C (citing U.S. Conf. of Mayors Res.
(June, 1984», resolved:
that the U.S. Conference of Mayors urges cities and other governmental jurisdictions to undertake their own efforts to address any existing pay inequities within their jurisdictions. . .
[and] ... that the U.S. Conference of Mayors calls upon the
Congress, the Administration, the States and the Courts to
study further the issues raised by 'comparable worth' with
particular attention to ways any existing pay inequities can be
addressed in a prompt, orderly and fiscally responsible
manner.
[d.

156. The resolution passed a month before the 1984 Democratic Convention, during
which Geraldine Ferraro becanxe the first female vice-presidential candidate in the nation's history. Feinstein had also been a serious contender for the nomination. Morrow,
Why Not a Woman?, TIME, June 4, 1984, at 18-19. See also Doermer, The Pride at San
Francisco, TIME, June 4, 1984, at 26-27. The backing of feminist leaders was thus crucial to her candidacy.
157. CAL. GOV'T CODE §53248 (West 1983) provides:
No local agency shall adopt or continue in effect an ordinance
or policy which prohibits consideration of comparability of the
value of work as one of the factors which may be used during
the collective-bargaining process to negotiate salaries. Existing
memoranda of understanding, presently in effect, would continue to control until they expire. Thereafter, there shall be
negotiations in accordance with this article.
[d. The preceding section of the same code also provides that:
As used in this article, "local agency" means any county, city,
city and county, including any charter county, city or city and
county, and any district, school district, municipal or public
corporation, political subdivision, or public agency of the
state, or any instrumentality of one or more of any such
agencies.
[d. Ct. SAN FRANcIsco CITY CHARTER §§8.400(a)-8.407.
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ries using a comparable worth standard.
On March 18, 1985, the Board of Supervisors passed a Salary Standardization Ordinance based on comparable worth principles. The measure has become widely known as the "meal
allowance" proposal.1 58 Even before asking the city's voters for
repeal of the ordinance, the mayor had already made known her
displeasure by twice vetoing it.159 The reasons for the mayor's
dramatic shift of position merit further attention.
1.

"Meal Allowance" or Pay Equity Funds

In her campaign against the Salary Standardization Ordinance, the Mayor always identified the Board of Supervisors as
its authors.160 But in fact, the idea of using a meal allowance to
achieve pay equity belongs to the Civil Service Commission. The
Commission raised the proposal with the mayor in a letter from
John Walsh, the Commission's General Manager for Personnel. 161 Walsh described the meal allowance to the mayor as one
of three options legally available to her and the Board for
achieving pay equity without a formal amendment to the Char158. SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 4 app. B (citing SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE 170-85 (1985-86) (Part II, Salary Standardization Ordinance, repealed 1985». The
latter provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. Meal Allowance
All full time employees in classifications related to the
benchmarks set forth below and in classifications 2585, 2586,
2587 and 2588, having a salary schedule of 44.7 or less, shall be
paid a $5.00 per day meal allowance in addition to their regular salary. This allowance shall be paid to the employee as a
part of his/her regular paycheck. If, for whatever reason, the
City is not able or permitted to make these payments, the City
agrees to set aside or reserve $8,800,000 in FY 1985-86 for the
purpose of making payments to these classifications in some
fashion at a later time. This provision shall be subject to the
budgetary and fiscal limitations of the Charter.
[d.

159. [d. at 2, 6-8. The mayor vetoed the ordinance on March 29, 1985 and August
22, 1985. The Board of Supervisors overrode her veto on April 11, 1985. [d. at 5; see also
infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion. On June 27, 1985, The
mayor placed Proposition E, asking for the ordinance's repeal on the fall ballot.
160. [d.
161. See Position Paper, supra note 125 (citing Letter from John J. Walsh, General
manager, Personnel, to the Hon. Diane Feinstein, Mayor, 1 (Feb. 28, 1985» (suggesting
several means of achieving pay equity without violating the City Charter).
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ter.I62 His proposal included the passage of a resolution favoring
pay equity which the mayor signed,I63 but the Commission refused to implement. 164
The Commission's letter set off a new round of negotiations
between the city employees and the city. On March 8, the Service Employee's International Union (SEIU) proposed a five
percent salary increase for 7,000 of the city's female and minority workers for 1985-86, and an additional five percent salary increase for 1987. The city responded by proposing the meal allowance as a way of granting the raises. By March 11, union and
city negotiators agreed to convert the five percent increases to a
dollar amount to be paid as a meal allowance. I6 1> But on March
12, George Agnost, City Attorney, decided the allowance was illegal under the City Charter.I66
In response to the City Attorney's ruling, contract negotiators deleted the allowance from the tentative agreement between
the city and the union substituting a pay equity fund instead.
On June 27, 1985, Proposal E went on the ballot;I67 on September 18, 1985, the SEIU filed an injunction in San Francisco Superior Court seeking to stop Proposition E from going on the fall
ballot. The union argued that in reality the mayor wanted voters
to reject the pay equity fund agreed upon between it and the
city, rather than the meal allowance, which all parties seemed to
agree was unworkable. I6s Reluctant to interfere with an electoral
162. Letter, supra note 161. Walsh advised the Mayor to consider amending Section
1-30 of the Annual Salary Ordinance (allowing free meals to certain employees while on
duty) to include "certain female-dominated classes or classes below a certain salary level
by providing a dollar amount benefit, such as $2.00 per day meal supplement allowance
while on duty." ld. (emphasis added).
163. See id. at 2, for an excellent summary of what occurred; see also Beasley, Cutler & Kurtz, Mayor's Ballot Measure; Letter to San Francisco Board of Supervisors I, 12 (Aug. 20, 1985) (excellent background analysis).
164. See Letter, supra note 161, at 2.
165.ld.
166.ld.
167. See San Francisco, Cal., Proposition E (November 1985). See also supra note
123 for relevant language.
168. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Equal Rights Advocate and San Francisco Women
Lawyers' Alliance, SEIU v. Feinstein, No. 845-936, at 8-11 (S.F. Superior Court, Sept. 18,
1985). Amici argued that the measure, calling for the repeal of a non-existent "meal
allowance" proposal, could be easily confused with $8.8 million pay equity fund (part of
a valid contract between city workers and the Board of Supervisors) by an electorate
unaware the latter had replaced the controversial "meal allowance" idea. They also char-
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matter, the court denied the injunction. 169 Thus, comparable
worth reached San Francisco's voters disguised as a meal allowance no one seemed to want and a contractual entanglement between a municipal union and city managers which is also headed
for the courts.l7°
This impending court battle illustrates just how fragmented
the issue of salaries can become and is a good example of what
one comparable worth analyst has called the "stakes of the actors."l7l The same author related the "arrival" of comparable
worth to a reform movement within the civil sector that began
at the federal level but has also had impact on city government.172 She linked this trend within the civil sector to the
highly politicized manner in which social change generally occurs in this country. She conceived of such change as the product of various coalitions and interest groups who come together
to trade support for various legislative and administrative reforms, making their implementation an often piecemeal affair. 173
Her insights help explain the mayor's seemingly contradictory
positions on comparable worth.
A close look at city politics in San Francisco in the months
before Proposition E went on the ballot shows the two parties
with the most to gain from the defeat of the comparable worth
ordinance to be the mayor and the Civil Service Commission.
The mayor's interest in defeating the Board of Supervisors' pay
equity measure is closely linked to her budget responsibilities
under the City Charter. By law, the mayor is responsible for
submitting a balanced budget for each fiscal year. 174 Feinstein
began focusing on this fact months before her repeal measure
went on the ballot. Both of her vetoes of the Board's pay equity
package raised the theme of her fiscal responsibilities to the
acterized Proposition E as an "unconstitutional attempt to breach a valid contract." [d.
at 14.
.
169. SEIU v. Feinstein, No. 845·936 (S.F. Superior Court, Sept. 18, 1985) (injunc·
tion den., Sept. 24, 1985).
170. See supra notes 164·68 and accompanying text for sources of confusion.
171. E. JOHANSEN, COMPARABLE WORTH: THE MYTH AND THE MOVEMENT 67 (1984).
See also id. at 52·55.
172. [d.
173. [d. at 16·19.
174. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1985, at 16, col. 4.
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city's voters.171i Later, the mayor revealed that, after enjoying a
$150 million surplus for two years, the city was now facing a $76
million dollar deficit. 176
Shortly thereafter, the mayor began blaming the Board's
pay equity package for the deficit. She predicted that massive
layoffs of city workers were imminent without the repeal of the
comparable worth ordinance. 177 By tying the deficit problem to
comparable worth, the mayor turned a serious embarrassment to
her advantage. She accomplished this by persuading voters that
in voting for repeal, they were voting against massive layoffs and
for a balanced budget.
On September 4, 1985, the Ninth Circuit handed down
AFSCME 11.178 While the mayor expressed regret at the ruling,
George Agnost, City Attorney, told reporters that he was
pleased. He also predicted that the Ninth Circuit ruling would
make it easier for the mayor to repeal the Board's pay equity
measure. 179 More interesting, however, is the City Attorney's
conception of the City Charter as a kind of accordian, flexible in
some respects, while extremely rigid in others. Thus, while it allows a wide latitude in making internal salary adjustments to
the Commission staff, the Charter forbids any consideration of a
comparable worth standard in setting wages for city workers,180
according to Agnost.
175. SEIU Report, supra note 130, 4 app. B. at 2, 6-8; The mayor proposed a $2
million pay equity plan as an alternative to the measure, which she estimated would cost
$28 to $30 million. [d. See also San Francisco Chronicle, supra note 174.
176. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1985, at I, col. 1. The mayor made the announcement on September 25, 1985. Given the budget crisis, the mayor characterized the
measure as "the height of fiscal responsibility." SEIU Report, supra note 130, at 4 app.
Bat 7.
177. [d. The same day, Feinstein told the press that "[t]here is no way to avoid $28
million ... in layoffs with the comparable worth package still in effect ... ."[d. at I,
col. 1. The city's Budget Analyst predicted at $29 million deficit by 1986-87. In August,
an update to the report enlarged that figure to $45 million, predicting the deficit by 1986
unless spending were curbed or new revenue found. [d. at 16, col. 4.
178. AFSCME II, 770 F.2d at 1401.
179. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 6, 1985 at 7, col. 4.
180. 85-2 Op. City Att'y 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Opinion]. The opinion concluded: (1) that a charter amendment would be necessary to implement comparable
worth and (2) that CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53248 (West 1983) did not apply to the City and
County of San Francisco because it did not set wage through collective bargaining and
also had "plenary authority" over wage-setting. Opinion, at 1.
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The City Attorney repeatedly cited section 8.047 of the City
Charter. That section sets out the procedures to be followed in
setting wages for San Francisco's Miscellaneous Employees, who
comprise the majority of the city's labor force.l81 All 7,000 employees affected by the Board of Supervisor's pay equity ordinance, for example, are considered Miscellaneous Employees. ls2
Agnost argues that section 8.047 provides detailed and rigid surveying procedures for arriving at the Miscellaneous Employees'
salaries. Thus, each survey must consider wages prevailing
among other Bay Area county governments as well as the area's
private employers for "like work and like service. mss The intrinsic worth of these employees' work to the city is therefore totally
irrelevant and cannot be considered. ls4
According to the City Attorney, the same provision of the
Charter does permit the Commission staff much discretion in
choosing benchmarks, shifting certain occupations from one
benchmark to another, raising the salaries of certain indexed
jobs, and any other changes necessary to produce an internal
alignment of salaries within each city department. lSI> Although
Agnost claims that the merits of comparable worth are not at
issue,ls6 it is clear that detailed formulae comparing the worth of
certain occupations would substantially interfere with the Commission's traditional freedom in wage-setting. In an important
181. See generally SAN FRANCISCO CITY CHARTER § 8.407.
182. SEID Report, supra note 130, at 17. The miscellaneous employee classification

does not include registered nurses, however. Id.
183. See Opinion, supra note 180, at 5-6.
184. Section 8.407 has the purpose of determining a generally prevailing wage from surveyed jurisdictions for like work and like service.
The value or worth of the work or service is not a criterion that
governs the collection of information from the survey jurisdictions
except in an incidental way as reflected in the surveyed rates.
Since worth or value of the services to the City is an internal factor that has no relationship to the generally prevailing rates found
in the surveyed jurisdictions, it cannot be considered by the Civil
Service Commission when making internal salary adjustments to
achieve a generally prevailing wage.
Id.
185. See Opinion, supra note 180, at 1. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying
text for an extended discussion of that body's discretionary powers in deciding city and
county salaries.
186. San Francisco, Cal., Proposition D (amending San Francisco Charter) (June,
1986). Under the initiative, for example, section 2.203-2 of the Charter, providing for
Reappointment of the Employee Relations Director by the Board of Supervisors, would
be deleted.
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sense, then, his argument stands for an effort by city managers
to preserve a civil sector free of all restrictions in many of its
internal procedures, rather than a direct opposition to the principles of comparable worth.
Events following the November 1985 elections show that efforts to preserve and even widen the Commission's discretionary
powers are intensifying. An initiative due to be placed on the
June, 1986 ballot, for example, seeks to streamline that part of
the Charter dealing with employee relations. If passed, the initiative would shift the supervision of all grievance procedures
from the Board of Supervisors to the mayor's office. The initiative would also allow the General Manager for Personnel to
make a large number of other decisions affecting employees
without going to the voters as presently provided. 187
The initiative effort is not unique to San Francisco, but is
part of a current, nationwide trend to streamline the civil sector
by giving its managers unprecedented freedoms. ISS San Francisco provides an important example of how such efforts are colliding with attempts to introduce pay equity for women and minorities. The city's opposition to comparable worth also
dramatizes the peculiar nature of the public sector, where officials act both as employers and as implementers of social policy.
187. Sections 3.662- .663 of the Proposition would establish a Department of Personnel Administration, whose director would be appointed by the mayor. The former
and his staff would regulate recruitment, promotion and transfer of city employees; he or
she would also "establish procedures to review and resolve allegations of discrimination
on the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin, ethnicity . . . ." [d. The director would
also conduct "a comprehensive investigation and survey of basic pay rates . . . in other
government jurisdictions." [d. at 6. The mayor, rather than the Board of Supervisors
would provide any "working condition benefits for employees covered" under section
8.407 and section 8.401. [d.
188. See Borjas, Wage Determination in the Federal Government: The Role of
Constituents and Bureaucrats, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1110, 1143 (1980). Borjas points to the
1978 Civil Service Reform Act as beginning the trend in "relax[ing] . . . the stringent
rules imposed by the civil service regulations concerning promotion and dismissal of federal workers. The new law [gave] ... federal agencies wider powers in initiating either
adverse or favorable personnel actions. . . and should increase the flexibility of bureaucratic managers to create ... wage differentials." [d. Borjas also argues that such differentials may also result from the political influence or "clout" of the particular agency
with the constituents it serves. [d. at 110; see also Los Angeles Times, October 14, 1985,
at A-4, col. 1, for a Defense Department proposal "to revamp the federal service system
by replacing the pay and grade scale with a pay-for-performance approach." [d.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Cases such as Bohm v. Hartz, which arise in the private sector are important in showing what actually motivates some ·employers conducting market surveys. Such cases are also ideal for
analysts interested in understanding how several discriminatory
acts work together to depress the wages of a smaller workforce.
With painstaking attention to detail, the Bohm dissent proved
the majority's superficial analysis of Hartz's pay scale and concluded that neither it nor the market survey justifying it were
legitimate. The dissent's methodology may prove a more subtle
and reliable supplement to statistical data in separating legitimate uses of market surveys from those violative of Title VII.
The two AFSCME cases and the current debate in San
Francisco are important for other reasons. They show that in the
public sector, pay equity is often lowest in a scale of priorities
which highlights budgetary concerns. They also illustrate the
two faces of discrimination: how a set of private traditions silently becomes public policy, and how the public arena twists
that policy even further, often to the detriment of women.
Helena Kaminski*

*Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987.
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